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University of Pennsylvania Law School 
Case in Point:  Radical challenges of neurolaw 
 
July 14, 2015 
 
Stephen Morse explores the state of play between law and neuroscience, where neurolaw is 
headed and what it means for personal responsibility. 
 
EXPERTS 
 
Stephen Morse 
Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law; Professor of Psychology and Law in Psychiatry; 
Associate Director, Center for Neuroscience & Society 
 
HOST 
 
Steven Barnes 
Host, Editor-in-Chief, Case in Point 
 
 
Steven Barnes:  Welcome to Case In Point produced by the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School.  I am your host, Steve Barnes.  In this episode, we will be looking at the state of play in, 
and any challenges neuroscience presents to the fields of law and criminal justice.  Whatever 
public perception may be based on TV crime in courtroom dramas, in this episode we’ll be 
looking at how in actual fact the burgeoning field of neurolaw is evolving in our justice system.  
We're fortunate to have with us to examine this topic one of the country's leading experts in this 
field, Stephen Morse. 
  
Stephen Morse is a Professor of Law, and a Professor of Psychology and Law in Psychiatry here 
at Penn, and he’s also the Associate Director of Penn Center for Neuroscience and Society.  In 
addition to being an attorney, Professor Morse is also a board certified forensic psychologist.  
Thank you so much professor Morse for joining us. 
 
Stephen Morse:  Thanks very much for having me Steve. 
 
Steven Barnes:  Let's get right into it.  If you will could you please describe for us what the 
actual state of play is, what the actual role neuroscience is playing in criminal justice today? 
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Stephen Morse:  For the most part we don't know the answer to that question because no one 
has yet collected systematic data about what is happening at the trial level.  We do have some 
decent preliminary data about appeals from criminal justice decisions that have involved 
neuroscience.  So far, there haven't been that many cases.  There is good … Data suggests that at 
capital punishment proceedings is becoming much more common.  And, these, of course, there 
are not that many of these, but it’s becoming much more common to use neuroscience evidence 
in mitigation. 
 
Steven Barnes:  It's interesting.  What kinds of neuro evidence are there?  I mean we see things 
in TV courtroom and crime dramas involving neuroscience and science, but what is actually used 
in trials today? 
 
Stephen Morse:  What is basically being used are either structural scans, which look at the 
anatomy of the brain, or physiological scans which look at the physiology of the brain, in an 
attempt to show that there is some abnormality typically that allegedly bears on whether a legal 
criterion is met, such as is the defendant competent to stand trial, did the defendant have the 
mental state required by the definition of the crime, was the defendant legally sane or not. 
  
Now, what appears to be developing in these appellate decisions is that when trial courts reject 
the evidence, not because it's not good scientific evidence, but typically because the trial court 
believes it's not relevant to the legal question, by and large these decisions are being upheld.  
What the advocates for the use of neuroscience have as their task before them is to show how 
this new science, fueled by noninvasive scanning imagery, is really relevant to legal questions, 
because virtually none of the studies is based on answering a legal question. 
  
Now, in some cases there's what I wouldn't call the new neuroscience, I just call it the old well-
characterized medical science, something like any EEG to show that somebody has epilepsy, 
which may bear on, for instance, whether when the person acted they were seizing or not seizing, 
and there these well-characterized medical conditions can be relevant.  But that's not what 
typically is meant by the use of the new neuroscience and neurolaw. 
 
Case in Point:  Radical challenges of neurolaw 
Page 3 of 23 
  
What people are typically talking about is the newer kinds of scanning techniques such as 
functional magnetic resonance imaging, which uses a scan to determine where there is 
heightened neural activity in the brain that is associated with a particular task or a particular 
condition or something of the sort.  Again, most of these studies based on that kind of scanning 
are not meant to answer legally relevant questions. 
 
Steven Barnes:  Could you give us for instance in terms of a case that might use an MRI?  What 
comes to mind is maybe someone who has or has acted in a violent way and uses that kind of 
reasoning, organic brain malfunctions or maladies as a defense? 
 
Stephen Morse:  The first thing to be said about that is that there will be people who have 
enormous, easily seen abnormalities that show no behavioral abnormalities.  From the law’s 
point of view, the question is always acts and mental states, the criteria in law are never brain 
states; they’re acts and mental states.  Brain states are simply going to be relevant if they bear on 
the presence or absence of a mental state. 
  
Let's assume you have a criminal who acted in a particularly violent way, and now comes to 
sentencing, whether capital sentencing or non-capital sentencing.  Suppose the money is found to 
do the scan, and what you see is damage to certain areas of the frontal cortex, which is thought to 
be that region of the brain most closely associated with exerting what's called executive control; 
the ability to guide your behavior, the ability to act for good reason, to control impulses and the 
like.  If you see abnormalities in those regions, it may be consistent with some kind of dyscontrol 
problem.  But ultimately that dyscontrol problem has to be evaluated behaviorally because the 
law’s criteria are behavioral. 
  
As I’m fond of saying, if someone is behaving psychotically, but their brain looks fine, they're 
psychotic.  If someone is behaving absolutely normally, but their brain looks broken for legal 
purposes, they’re normal, holding aside questions of malingering. 
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Steven Barnes:  Just to step back a bit, so what you're saying is that typically when neuroscience 
or neural evidence is used it's usually used in the appeals process, meaning the court has 
typically found them I would assume guilty or? 
 
Stephen Morse:  No, no.   
 
Steven Barnes:  Or if you could just walk us through that. 
 
Stephen Morse:  No.  The way it's always going to come up is at the trial level or at the 
sentencing level someone is going to seek to introduce neuroscience evidence.  Typically it's 
going to be in a civil suit it’ll be the plaintiff, and in a criminal suit it's going to be the defendant.  
Now this an expensive technology, and prisons don't have scanners.  So, to get the defendant to a 
scanner and get the court order to pay for it, it’s expensive, this is not going to happen all that 
often, at least not yet.  As scanning technology gets to be more efficient and cheaper, then we 
might see more of it, but for now not. 
  
Typically you're going to have either a plaintiff in a civil suit or a defendant in a criminal suit try 
to introduce evidence of neuroscience that bears on the legal question in front of them.  The 
judge has then got to make a decision, “Am I going to admit the evidence because I think it's 
scientifically valid and legally relevant, or am I not going to admit the evidence?”  Often there 
might be a preliminary hearing on precisely that question. 
  
Okay.  Let's assume the judge decides to exclude it, and now the party who sought to introduce it 
loses.  They now have a ground for appeal.  The judge made a mistake in excluding this 
evidence, and so it goes to an appeal court.  The appeal court has to decide using the rules of 
scientific and clinical evidence, which is a specific set of rules in the criminal justice and legal 
system generally, whether the judge made the appropriate decision or not.  Now typically there is 
a lot of deference to trial court decisions on these issues, so you're not going to get those kinds of 
decisions overturned very frequently. 
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Steven Barnes:  Examining how our justice system has evolved incorporating mental health into 
it; you've coined the term desert/disease jurisprudence.  What does that mean? 
 
Stephen Morse:  First let me say that the new neuroscience and new neurolaw is much broader 
than mental health.  But the same sorts of considerations apply across the board in what I call 
desert/disease jurisprudence.  What I'm looking for is how the state justifies incarcerating 
somebody.  What I've argued is we have two general justifications for incarcerating somebody in 
our system.  The first is you've committed a crime, you're a responsible agent, and you deserve to 
be punished.  Okay, so that's desert jurisprudence. 
  
Then, we sometimes incarcerate people who may be a danger to others, not because they've 
committed a crime and deserve it, but because we think they are dangerous, and they are not 
responsible agents.  Typically the reason they're not responsible is because they have some sort 
of mental abnormality.  For instance, involuntary civil commitment is a form of disease 
jurisprudence. 
  
Now the problem is it leaves a gap in social safety in the following way.  Suppose you have 
somebody who's done their time for the crime and you now have to release them from prison 
because they've done their time, and they haven't yet committed a new crime, but you really 
think they are very, very dangerous.  What can we do to control them?  The answer is nothing 
constitutionally.  As a way of dealing with what I call the gap between desert and disease 
jurisprudence, what do you do with responsible dangerous agents who haven't yet done a new 
crime for which we could clutch them?  What do you do? 
  
Well, you can either expand the desert jurisprudence, for example, by three strikes and you're out 
types of laws, or you can expand the disease jurisprudence by finding in large groups of people 
we are willing to say are not responsible for themselves.  The most substantial form of that 
recently are so-called mentally abnormal sexually violent predator commitments which can be 
imposed on someone who's been convicted of a crime and done their time for a sex offense but at 
the end of having done their time they can now be civilly committed. 
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The Supreme Court in two cases in 1997 and 2002 approved such commitments and said, “Well, 
they're really not responsible for themselves,” which strikes me as quite paradoxical.  We’ve just 
punished the heck out of them because they were responsible, and now we're saying once they've 
done their time you're not responsible, so we get to lock you up because you're not responsible.  
It strikes me as paradoxical. 
 
Steven Barnes:  That raises a whole host of questions, but let's step back a little bit and say you 
addressed this in part.  What does it mean according to the letter of the law to be criminally 
responsible versus incompetent or unfit at the trial level?  And get into those criteria both for the 
law and in neuroscience, and if I may as a follow-on to be responsible for oneself after the fact, 
perhaps outside of the realm of sexual predation? 
 
Stephen Morse:  First of all criminal responsibility is typically a retrospective evaluation.  We're 
trying to figure out the person's mental state at the time of the crime.  Various competencies or 
fitness are present mental state evaluations, what is the person's mental state now.  Let's do 
criminal responsibility first.  Prima facie criminal liability depends on the prosecution proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt what are the definitional what are called elements of the crime. 
  
Let's just take a very simple example.  What is murder?  Murder includes an intentional act that 
is a killing conduct done with the purpose of causing death, and you actually do cause the death.  
Prosecution proves that beyond reasonable doubt you’re prima facie guilty.  However, what we 
have in the United States are what are called affirmative defenses, meaning even if the 
prosecution can prove the definitional elements of the crime there may be some other reason why 
you should not be held responsible. 
  
One example, our class of defense is called justifications.  What this means is under the 
circumstances what you did was right even though was otherwise wrongful.  For example, if I 
intentionally kill you because you are about to wrongfully kill me I'm acting in justifiable self-
defense.  It’s typically wrong intentionally to kill people but under the circumstances when I’m a 
victim of wrongful deadly threat I'm justified in doing it.  If I am, I'm not guilty. 
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Then there are a class of affirmative defenses called excuses in which we say the person did the 
wrong thing, but they're not a morally responsible agent to begin with.  For example, suppose I 
kill my victim in the delusional belief that the victim is a Bulgarian agent about to kill me.  I kill 
them intentionally.  There's no question about that, so I’m prima facie guilty.  But if I'm believed 
I really don't know right from wrong because I am mentally ill, so I would be excused.  It was 
the wrong thing to do to kill my victim, but I would be excused. 
  
All right.  When we come to competences like competence to stand trial or competence to be 
sentenced or competence to be executed, these are present state functional, let me call them 
rationality criteria.  We ask for a process to be fair and to be just what must the person being 
evaluated be able to do?  To be competent to stand trial, you must be able to understand the 
nature of the proceedings, to understand the charges, and to be able rationally to assist counsel 
for example.  That's very functional. 
  
Now the knock-on question if I recall correctly because I've had to give you a long-winded 
background to get where we're going is what does neuroscience have to contribute to the mental 
state or act questions for criminal responsibility, whether you have a mental disorder for 
purposes of the insanity defense and how can it help with current competence evaluations. 
 
Steven Barnes:  Also, are there any conflicts, or are they in pretty decent harmony in terms of 
the criteria in law and in neuroscience? 
 
Stephen Morse:  They're completely different.  Law is an enterprise about how human beings 
live together.  Neuroscience is a purely mechanical science.  Neurons don't have mental states, 
the connectome doesn't have a sense of past, present, and future, neural networks don't have 
aspirations, they don't care about anything.  These are properties of people.  The law is a very 
folk psychological enterprise, meaning it crucially depends on a view of the person as having 
mental states that are causally implicated in our behavior.  It's not just mental causation, but 
mental state causation is crucial.  That what's always been evaluated, acts and mental states in 
law. 
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Neuroscience is just a mechanical science.  So, what you always have in thinking about the 
relation between neuroscience and any legal criterion whatsoever is how do you do the 
translation from a purely mechanical science to a purely folk psychological enterprise of acting 
human beings.  By the way, when I say folk psychological that is not meant to be a pejorative 
term.  It's a technical term in philosophy of mind and actually in psychology that refers to 
explaining human behavior in part by mental states such as desires, beliefs, intentions, willings, 
plans.  There’s dispute about what the mental furniture is, but mental furniture is crucial. 
  
Now it's interesting to compare neuroscience to psychology and psychiatry because psychology 
and psychiatry sometimes treat us as a hunk of meat.  When you go to your pill doc, he or she is 
treating you like a hunk of meat.  He’s trying to alter your neurophysiology.  But often they're 
treating you as a human being with a life story.  So even the most chemically oriented, 
organically oriented psychiatrist or psychologist is going to ask you and then come in the office 
not just have you been taking your meds and are you having any side effects.  They’re going to 
ask, how's it going in life, how are things at work, how are things at home, how are things 
whatever brought you here in the first place. 
  
It's folk psychological, it’s telling stories the way the law is.  The translation is a lot easier.  
Neuroscience it’s pure mechanism.  It's a really hard translation problem, and that's where you 
have the problem with legal relevance.  The way I’m fond of putting it is this, you need to be 
able to show the chain of inference from a neuroscientific finding to the legal criterion that isn’t 
just made up stuff.  Now-- 
 
Steven Barnes:  For example. 
 
Stephen Morse:  For example suppose you have … Let's use a sentencing proceeding.  Suppose 
you have somebody who has an enormously broken looking brain.  There are cases on record 
just like this.  But there's absolutely no evidence of any behavioral dysfunction whatsoever, 
except maybe they committed a crime, and all crime is not a behavioral dysfunction.  It's maybe 
a moral dysfunction, but it's not always a behavioral dysfunction.  You've got someone who's got 
a really broken looking brain but no behavioral problem. 
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To use the broken brain evidence in that case is an example of what I call rhetorical relevance, 
not real relevance, the argument being, “Gee, look, he's got a hole in his head, he must be less 
responsible.”  But it just simply doesn't follow, because unless that hole in his head produced 
something that is actually a mitigating or excusing condition in law it's not really relevant. 
  
I recently reviewed with an eminent neuroscientist for a chapter in a book all the legal doctrines 
in criminal law that have to do with guilt and sentencing.  What we did is we went through the 
available today neuroscience evidence to see what neuroscience could help us with in terms of 
all the criteria questions that the law raises ranging from did the person act as opposed to was it a 
neuromuscular spasm, did they have the intent required by the definition of the crime, were they 
mentally ill, do they have a behavioral problem such that it ought to be taken into account at 
sentencing. 
  
We went through every single doctrine.  What we concluded is that at present, and I want to 
stress at present, there's almost no new neuroscience, again, independent of well-characterized 
medical conditions that could bear on these questions, there is almost no new neuroscience 
evidence that can answer these questions. 
  
For instance, except for certain well-characterized medical conditions that may show us that the 
person's bodily movements were not actions at all, I gave the example of seizures before, we 
really can't tell you whether a person acted or not, especially we can’t do it with the retrospective 
evaluation because most criminals are not wearing a scanner, a portable scanner when they 
commit crimes.  And, in the months that will go on before they get scanned the brain could have 
changed in ways that might not allow us to make an inference to what their brain looked like four 
months earlier, for example. 
  
Mental states are crucial to the criminal law.  Did you do what you did with the purpose of 
causing the harm?  Did you know you’d cause the harm?  Were you consciously aware of the 
risk you were causing the harm?  Were you not aware of it but you should’ve been aware of it?  
Those are simple common sense distinctions that criminal law makes and they can be crucial.  If 
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you do something on purpose, we typically think it's more indifferent to the rights and interests 
of other people than if you're not aware of a risk you’ve created, but you should’ve been.  
Neither is good but doing it on purpose is worse, because it really shows extreme indifference to 
the interests and rights of other people. 
  
Lots of criminal law guilt questions involve distinguishing those mental states.  How do we do it 
now?  We do it by inference from the actions of the person, common sense inferences from those 
actions, words they may have spoken.  Wouldn't it be nice if we had a really good objective 
biological marker?  The answer is, we don't, and it's not on the horizon.  We can’t even use 
scanning technology these days to diagnose even severe mental disorder.  It's simply not 
diagnostically sensitive enough yet, which was admitted by the American Psychiatric 
Association in its recent publication of the newest DSM-5 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders.  We'd love to have some objective markers, but we don't. 
  
When it comes to did the defendant, let's say for purposes of the insane defense, know right from 
wrong, we don't have a clue how to look at that question with neuroscience.  The same thing 
goes for competence evaluations.  You're much better off just doing a straightforward behavioral 
functional evaluation. 
  
Now much of what I've been saying sounds quite critical of the neuroscience but it should not be 
misunderstood that way.  Much of the science is good science.  My problem is the inferences 
from the science to the law which are often over claimed these days.  There's a separate point as 
well.  Most of the enthusiasm for neurolaw has been spurned by a technology I talked about 
before, functional magnetic resonance imaging, which looks at brain activity without being 
invasive. 
 
Steven Barnes:  MRIs. 
 
Stephen Morse:  MRIs, except this is looking at blood flow in certain ways to get a proxy for 
neural activity in particular regions of the brain.  FMRI was only discovered; the technique was 
only discovered in the early nineteen-nineties.   
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Steven Barnes:  I didn’t realize that. 
 
Stephen Morse:  Yeah.  MRI has been around for a long time, structural MRI, the sort of thing 
you go to find out how your back looks or something of the sort.  We've had scanning techniques 
for brain physiology for quite some time, but they all involved invasive kinds of techniques.  
FMRI is completely non-invasive. 
  
To start to do the studies on normal populations you have to have a scanner.  Scanners are so 
expensive that they only became routinely available for research universities outside the clinical 
arena starting in around 2000.  Now the kind of neuroscience that’s most relevant to law, because 
law is about behaving human beings, are what are known as cognitive, affective, and social 
neuroscience.  These studies have been around let's call it now 14 years, 15 years.  They 
typically have small numbers of subjects because they are very, very expensive to do.  What 
you're working on is one of the hardest problems, and many people think is the hardest problem 
in all science.  How does this two and a half-pound hunk of white and grey organic jelly produce 
consciousness, intentionality, the kinds of creatures we think we are?  How the brain enables the 
mind and action is, and I say this without fear of contradiction from any neuroscientist, 
completely unknown at present.  We know the brain does enable the mind in action.  If your 
brain is dead, you're dead, and you're not doing much of interest at all. 
  
It's a really hard problem.  We’ve been working on it for 14 years using what's still, despite the 
astonishing advances, a relatively crude technology.  It's no surprise we haven't made huge 
advances yet.  Now I expect there will be further huge advances in the future, but just not yet.  
These are really hard problems. 
 
Steven Barnes:  At present what are the typical cases where neurolaw comes into play in a case?  
Are they primarily violent crimes or are they cases where someone is running a Ponzi scheme 
and uses a defense like I'm a sociopath?  What are the kinds of cases where neurolaw comes into 
play? 
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Stephen Morse:  Again, we don't have the data.  What we do know is that except in the case of 
capital punishment proceedings where the defense will typically have much greater resources 
than they would at trial; it's mostly people who have the resources or have the backing of some 
sort of organization that will actually pay for the scan and gin this all up. 
  
In the civil justice system, it's used, obviously, to show medical injuries and the like in tort 
claims.  By the way, one of the things I think is optimistic about neurolaw is pain and suffering is 
a crucial aspect of tort damages.  As we all know when you go the doctor and you say, “I'm in 
pain,” the doctor says, “How much on a scale of zero to 10,” 10 the most, zero the least, “How 
much is it,” that's very subjective. 
 
Steven Barnes:  For tort, by tort you mean criminal— 
 
Stephen Morse:  Civil wrong. 
 
Steven Barnes:  Civil wrong, liability, injury, that kind of thing. 
 
Stephen Morse:  Yeah, civil injuries.  Wouldn't it be nice if we could have an objective measure 
of how much pain a person was really in?  There are now laboratories working on this problem 
in both the United States and Europe, and I think they're making real progress.  Is it ready for 
primetime yet?  No, but they are making progress. 
  
In the criminal justice system, again, except for capital punishment proceedings, you don't see it 
very much.  My guess is you see it more in serious felony cases, obviously, because more is at 
stake.  Why are people going to gin up this expensive technology for some not such a serious 
criminal offense?  But again, we don't know what's going on at the trial level, which is what we 
really like to know, because as we all know in the federal criminal justice system 98-percent of 
defendants plead guilty, in the state criminal justice systems, it’s probably about 93-94-percent 
of cases plead guilty.  There aren't that many appeals, so we don't know what things look like at 
the trial level. 
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Steven Barnes:  Are any kind of data collection efforts statewide nationally under way at the 
moment? 
 
Stephen Morse:  Yes, a couple of scholars have started to try to collect these data.  They've also 
been collected on behavioral genetics, how often does behavioral genetics come in.  By the way, 
behavioral genetics is in precisely the same state as far as I'm concerned as neuroscience.  When 
people cracked the genome in the early aughts everyone said it's going to transform law, it didn't, 
not at all, but people tried to use behavioral genetics evidence in just the same way.  Show that 
there's some kind of gene by environment abnormal interaction and people expect there to be 
legal ramifications.  But once again it’s only if it helps us answer the law’s act and mental state 
questions.  The answer is not yet, but that technology, of course, is getting a lot cheaper.  You 
might see more of it because it is so much cheaper. 
 
Steven Barnes:  Getting back to a point you mentioned before about people who have been 
convicted of a crime and then go out in society, shifting gears a little bit, and society wanting to 
prevent against further dangerous crimes being committed.  Not quite a related topic but in a 
similar vein, last November the Connecticut Office of the Child Advocate released a report 
basically saying that Adam Lanza, the shooter, his mother, educators missed opportunities and 
warning signs, the report said, leading up to the massive Sandy Hook elementary school 
shooting.  My question is how and to what extent can neuroscience or other kinds of science 
predict, control, possibly prevent such grave crimes such as mass shootings, mass killings? 
 
Stephen Morse:  The way to start to answer that question is to understand that mass shootings 
are despite the horror of them, they are extremely infrequent events, extremely infrequent.  What 
we know statistically is unless you have the most extraordinarily sensitive tool for making the 
prediction we're not going to be able very accurately to predict extremely infrequent events.  If 
we were to set the sensitivity so high that we picked up most of the people who really would do 
it, we’d pick up vastly more people who wouldn't do it at the same sensitivity filter. 
  
This is a major problem in prediction technology, whether the prediction technology is 
behavioral as it primarily is today, or it moves to some other predictive kind of scheme.   
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Let's just talk about how accurate we are with behavioral evaluations.  It turns out clinicians are 
not very good at this at all if they do it on a clinical basis, based on their own experience and 
judgment.  If you use a more statistical or actuarial tool based on data that has been gathered 
you're going to get more accurate. 
  
But even for very high-risk people, if it’s low based rate behavior, it's going to be almost 
impossible to predict accurately without also having lots of what we call false positives, people 
we say yes, they’ve passed the threshold, but then turns out no, they wouldn't do it.  That's going 
to be the majority. 
  
Just think about the profile of somebody like Adam Lanza.  Now I don't know enough about him, 
so I'm just going to be a little bit hypothetical here.  He's a young male.  He's got some problems 
with mental disorder let's assume.  He acts a bit oddly, and he likes guns.  Now, how many 
people do you think fit that profile? 
 
Steven Barnes:  I don't have the data on that. 
 
Stephen Morse:  I don’t have the data either, but let's put it this way, this can be a large number, 
and it's not going to be a trivial number.  How many Lanzas are there?  Was it a tragedy that 
Adam Lanza’s problems were missed?  Yes.  If they had been addressed, would it necessarily not 
have happened?  No, it might have happened anyhow because the treatments he was offered and 
may even have accepted might not have worked.  We don't know to what extent his behavior was 
driven by his abnormalities or some parts of his character that were in interaction with his 
abnormalities. 
  
Can neuroscience help?  In 2013 and 2014 two studies appeared that I call proof-of-concept 
studies, meaning that they used a neural marker to see if you could enhance the accuracy of a 
prediction of future antisocial conduct beyond what we have now with behavioral evaluation 
techniques.  They both found positive results. 
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Now there were, what we call in the trade, artifacts in these studies, problems with the 
methodology that lead you to be cautious about the inferences.  Nonetheless, I think it is 
perfectly plausible that someday we might get, and these are not ready for prime time use yet, 
but as with the technology gets better and better it may be that scans will give us a biomarker 
that will help increase the accuracy. 
  
Now then the question is you're always going to do a cost-benefit analysis.  How expensive is it 
to collect that data?  How much does it increase our accuracy?  You obviously would not spend a 
lot of money to increase the accuracy of a prediction of a simple assault, but you might, to 
predict whether someone is going to be a mass murderer.  Now this use of biomarkers really 
scares people because they're afraid of biologising violent crime because that is had a really 
nasty history in our country.  I'm with them on that. 
 
Steven Barnes:  What do you mean by biologise? 
 
Stephen Morse:  In other words thinking that violent crime is somehow a biological problem as 
opposed to a problem of society and opportunity and the like.  Because remember, anytime you 
can focus on the brain as the cause, then it allows you to distract yourself from what might be the 
social cause.  Here’s an example and then I'll come back to the prediction question.  In thinking 
about whether juveniles should be punished less harshly than adults, something the Supreme 
Court has addressed three times in the last nine years, a lot of advocates wanted to focus on the 
fact that the juvenile brain is not yet fully mature, which it is not, and does it surprise us that the 
juvenile brain on average is different from the adult brain?  It doesn't surprise me at all, and 
anybody who is surprised I think is being pretty foolish. 
  
Indeed, if we haven't found brain differences I would conclude that the brain science isn’t 
sophisticated enough yet, and we will find them.  Okay.  We know that we already knew there 
were behavioral differences, and finding the brain differences is consistent.  Why is it that across, 
let's just use the Western world and within different classes of our society et cetera, we have such 
vastly different juvenile misbehavior rates, when the brains presumably are all pretty much the 
same. 
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Even if you look at kids from the middle class, let's say, where they haven't had a cultural 
depravation or something of the sort; Swedish and Finnish adolescent crime rates don't look the 
same as American adolescent crime rates.  If we focus just on the brain what we're not focusing 
on is the social determinants and the psychological determinants of criminal justice. 
  
Let’s go back to the prediction question.  We have already decided in our criminal justice system 
that we are going to make predictions.  We know we're not very good at it, but we’ve already 
decided we're going to do it.  We have to do it to run the railroad successfully.  We do it for 
deciding whether someone should be diverted from criminal justice, should someone be put on 
probation as opposed to send to prison, should someone be paroled.  Remember, I talked 
previously about mentally abnormal sexually violent predator commitments.  Is this person going 
to be a danger in the future?  Because even if they're not responsible, if they’re not going to be a 
danger, why lock them up? 
  
We're using predictions all the time.  We think it’s justifiable to do that.  If we think it's 
justifiable to do that what's the argument for not doing it better?  What's the argument for doing 
it worse?  Unless you think it's going to lead to bias, prejudice, subordination, stereotyping of 
certain groups and the like, which is, given our history, a real possibility and something we need 
to be profoundly careful about. 
 
Steven Barnes:  You're both a lawyer as well as a forensic psychologist? 
 
Stephen Morse:  Right. 
 
Steven Barnes:  And an expert in where the law and neuroscience intersect? 
 
Stephen Morse:  Mm-hmm (affirmative). 
 
Steven Barnes:  What are the other implications, someone who for example is worried about 
constitutional rights or personal civil liberties about on the one hand trying to make sure 
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someone who may be prone biologically, psychologically, sociologically, whatever to violent 
crimes up to including murder or mass murder, and at the same time spreading the net too wide 
in drawing people into the criminal justice system or otherwise should not be involved? 
 
Stephen Morse:  Unless they've committed a crime you can’t sweep them into the criminal 
justice system.  You're going to need some form of preventive detention.  Now one of my good 
colleagues here at Penn, Paul Robinson has suggested that we ought to just in a sense bite the 
bullet and admit we're doing pure preventive detention.  In other words, what he wants to do is 
get rid of desert/disease jurisprudence and just move to a pure dangerousness evaluation let’s say 
at the end of a prison term, which is by the way something the Norwegians do.  They have a 
form of pure preventive detention.  And, so, Anders Breivik, the young nationalist Norwegian 
who killed 70-some odd people, is going to serve at max a 21-year term for murder … 
 
Steven Barnes:  Under Norwegian law. 
 
Stephen Morse:  Under Norwegian law yes, but then they are entitled to keep them locked up 
just because he is dangerous.  Now there is something to be said for it.  It’s not assuming we 
were good enough that we weren't sweeping too many people into preventive detention, but 
there's something to be said for dessert/disease jurisprudence, which is this, what it does is if it 
isn’t abused it maximizes autonomy and liberty.  As long as people are responsible agents we 
leave them alone unless they commit a crime. 
  
Now that produces risks.  That was the gap I talked about earlier.  That produces risks.  The 
question is it's a moral and political and ultimately legal question, how much risk are we willing 
to bear to preserve a sphere of liberty and autonomy for citizens that might produce some degree 
of danger we'd rather live without? 
 
Steven Barnes:  How do you encourage those kinds of debates on two very technical topics?  It's 
hard to be a lawyer, and it's hard to be a neuroscientist, and to have a good grasp of both is 
absolutely remarkable.  How do you encourage debates around these topics in the public sphere? 
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Stephen Morse:  Well there's been actually a lot of this going on.  Now one thing, and let me do 
some special pleading, I'm part of a group that is sponsored by the MacArthur Foundation called 
The Research Network on Law and Neuroscience.  It had a prior incarnation that was called The 
Law and Neuroscience Project.  The idea was to bring together neuroscientists, lawyers, and 
philosophers with a view towards figuring out how to conceptualize the field and how to do 
some research on legally relevant topics that might actually be useful to the law. 
  
I can talk a little bit about the research we did.  But these kinds of discussions of the sort I was 
just talking about have started to make it into the media.  The Economist magazine, in an 
editorial in 2002 said, “Genetics could gut the concept of human nature, could do all these 
terrible things, but neuroscience could do it first.” 
  
Alan Alda, as you may know, did a TV special on PBS called the “Brains On Trial” that had an 
associated website that actually did discuss these kinds of questions in a very intelligent way 
with people from one of three camps I would say in this area, people who think neuroscience is 
ready for prime time now, people who think it will never be ready for prime time.  I’m in the 
intermediate camp, I'm someone who says in principle I think it will have relevance, not as much 
as the proponents think, but it will have relevance, but not yet, or not much yet. 
 
Steven Barnes:  You consider yourself in the intermediate camp.  What kind of things or 
developments in neuroscience do you see as promising? 
 
Stephen Morse:  All right, I already talked about getting objective indicators of pain.  I also 
think these proof-of-concept prediction technologies are very, very important, and could be 
really, really helpful in increasing accuracy of the sorts of judgments we already make. 
  
Another is what I call memory recognition.  Some extraordinarily interesting work is being done 
on that now with some just amazingly clever research methodology that is using a particular 
technique called pattern analysis that looks at the whole brain, not just a particular region of the 
brain, it’s looking at the activation of the whole brain, and essentially it's trying to determine if 
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we can use neuro data to identify when a person is having an accurate memory or not an accurate 
memory of what they've actually gone through. 
  
Now as you know, the law is always looking at storytelling.  One way to look at the legal process 
is storytelling.  “Here's what I said would happen.”  “No, here is what I said would happen,” and 
we have a dispute.  Often it depends on memory.  We know that memory can be notoriously 
fallible and that memory is not like a photo album where every time you open it you see the 
same thing, every time you open a memory it changes a little bit.  Wouldn't it be nice if we had 
some objective biological indicator of whether when you say yes I remember that you’re 
remembering accurately or not? 
 
Steven Barnes:  A witness for example. 
 
Stephen Morse:  A witness, exactly.  Some really, really interesting and very promising 
research is being done about that.  Those are some, I think, really good examples. 
 
Steven Barnes:  As a kind of counterpoint in your research you've written about the radical 
challenges neuroscience presents to personal responsibility.  What do you mean by that and 
where do you think we're headed on that front? 
 
Stephen Morse:  Neuroscience is thought by some people to present the challenge of 
determinism.  If determinism is true, how can any of us be responsible?  Neuroscience cannot 
prove the truth of determinism.  No science can prove the truth of determinism.  It's a working 
hypothesis of scientists.  Neuroscience is just the newest science on the block.  There's nothing 
new. 
  
This is a debate: is personal responsibility possible in a world that is a causal universe or a 
deterministic universe?  This has been going on in one form or another for millennia.  There is 
no resolution to that metaphysical debate in sight.  Neuroscience certainly doesn't answer it.  
Interestingly enough among the people who do this for a living, the philosophers of 
responsibility, the dominant view is even if determinism is true we can be responsible. 
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Now they don't have slam-dunk arguments but neither does the other side.  Now, what do we 
know about our law?  Our law treats some people, most people as responsible, some people as 
not.  Law depends on what I called previously the folk psychological concept of the person, the 
view that is that we can explain ourselves to each other and to ourselves using mental state 
concepts.  I would ask why is Steve Barnes in this room today?  I'm not— 
 
Steven Barnes:  Good question. 
 
Stephen Morse:  Well I'm about to answer it for you, and you can correct me if I'm wrong.  
You're not going to tell me a story.  Even if you were the world's greatest neuroscientist, you 
wouldn’t tell me a story about your brain nervous system.  You'd say something roughly along 
the following lines, “My job at Penn is to produce certain kinds of product that will help promote 
the goals of the law school.  I believe that by doing this Case In Point interview with Stephen 
Morse I will produce that kind of product.  I form the intention, therefore, to do this interview 
and here I am.”  You will tell me a story about your desires and your beliefs and your intentions, 
right?  That's the folk psychological model. 
  
Now, again, mental states aren’t going to explain everything.  There are going to be biological 
variables that help explain why you're here.  I can assure you there are others psychological 
kinds of variables and sociological variables, but in explaining human action you don't want to 
leave out mental states. 
  
We all think mental states do work.  Now we can be fooled about our mental states or in denial 
about our mental states, but we think they do work and law depends on it.  Think what law is.  
It’s a series of rules that are addressed to human beings to help them guide their conduct.  We 
use them as premises in citing what we have reason to do.  We’re all acting in the shadow of the 
law all the time. 
  
What kind of creature can use rules to guide their conduct?  Only creatures with mental states of 
the sort we have.  We share with lots of other animals various kinds of mental phenomena like 
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consciousness, but to the best of our knowledge we are the only creatures that act for genuine 
reasons, and law gives us reasons.  I mean how could the law even be coherent if it didn't give us 
reasons to guide our behavior?  It would be an incoherent enterprise. 
  
There are a group of neuroscientists out there who are the radical challengers.  They say, “We 
are not the kinds of creatures we think we are.”  To use a very interesting phrase coined by one 
of them in a very influential article, two of them, and a very influential article from 2006, “We 
are simply victims of neuronal circumstances.”  In other words, we have mental states but they're 
not doing any work. 
 
Steven Barnes:  Meaning we have no free will or … ? 
 
Stephen Morse:  No, no, no, it means we’re just not the kinds of creatures we think we are.  You 
think you’re asking me questions for a reason.  You're not.  You have these mental states but it's 
just our brains are interacting, we’re just victims of neurons, we're not acting human beings who 
act for reasons and can be guided by reasons. 
  
When I talked about the determinism debate before, that camp of people who thinks we can be 
responsible, even if determinism is true, accepts that we are the kinds of creatures we think we 
are, we’re the kind of creatures who can act for reasons and be guided by reasons.  And, so, it's 
consistent with the law we have. 
  
If the radical challenges are right that our reasons, our mental states do no explanatory work, 
think of them as sort of cranial appendixes, evolutionary natural selection has caused us to have 
them, but they don't do anything, just like we have an appendix that doesn’t do anything.  Now 
there’s some evidence that it does, but let’s assume what we all learned in high school biology 
that the appendix doesn't do anything.  That's the way to think about mental states.  If that is the 
truth it's not just criminal responsibility that becomes incoherent; it’s law that becomes 
incoherent. 
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But would I say that the radical challenge is this?  Let's assume you're right.  What do I do now?  
Do I wait for my brain to tell me what to do?  Am I going to stop deliberating?  Now I have a 
theory about the radical challengers when it comes to criminal law.  They hate the justification of 
punishment called retribution.  They think it's pre-scientific, and they think it's barbaric.  
Retribution being simply, again for you non-law listeners, the theory that one justification for 
punishing people is that they have committed a crime and they deserve to be punished.  It is good 
in itself to give people what they deserve. 
  
These people believe that’s barbaric.  They don’t believe in that kind of ethics that anything is 
good in itself, and they think if you're a retributivist because they often confuse it with revenge, 
but not always, it’s a theory of justice for retributivism saying it’s good to give people what they 
deserve.  They think if we got rid of our retributivism the criminal justice system would be 
kinder and gentler.  But you can be a tender retributivist.  I'm a tender retributivist.  I believe we 
should give people what they deserve, but I think we give people much too harsh punishments 
for too many things.  Also, I’m not a pure retributivist.  I think we need to take consequences 
into account as well. 
  
But the interesting thing is if you look at the most draconian criminal justice changes over the 
last 30 or 40 years, they haven't been driven by retributivism, they've been driven by concern 
with public safety, consequential concerns, not with doing justice to individuals based on their 
desert.  I fear our criminal justice system that is unmoored from notions of retribution.  Here's the 
actually most interesting thing about these radicals, if they're right and reasons do no work I have 
no reason to do anything, and neither do they. 
 
Steven Barnes:  Right, so is the argument there representing them as best as you can, seeing 
how you take a different view, do they view mental activity and related behaviors simply as 
random?  Are we all the times in that— 
 
Stephen Morse:  No, no, no, it's not random, it's completely determined, but your mental states 
play no part in that process because they don't do anything.  It's just brain states that are doing 
everything.  Now there are two issues.  One is, is there a scientific basis for this claim?  At 
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present I think it's utterly scientifically preposterous.  It's totally on the come, as it were, and I 
see nothing in the developing neuroscience that would suggest that our mental states do no work. 
  
In fact, what I often say to my neuroscientist friends who work at this level of explanation, 
cognitive, social, and effective, is your job is not to explain away mental states.  Your job is to 
explain them.  The second thing is, suppose somehow I got convinced by their arguments and 
evidence that they were right.  Now, what would it mean for me to be convinced?  That suggests 
that there's an acting person here, not just brain states.  Brains don’t get convinced; people get 
convinced. 
  
Let's assume somehow my brain somehow got convinced and then it convinced me that I was 
convinced.  Think how dualistic that sounds, by the way, and neuroscientists often talk 
incredibly dualistically even though they have juror dualism, the other notion that we have minds 
separate from our bodies that are somehow in causal connection.  I say to them, “Okay, suppose 
you're right, what you’re arguing for is morally, politically, and legally inert.”  If reasons don’t 
matter, once again we have no reason to do anything. 
 
Steven Barnes:  Well I think that's a great way to end it.  Professor Morse, thank you so much 
for joining us here. 
 
Stephen Morse:  Steve, thank you so much. 
 
Steven Barnes:  It’s our pleasure.  Please join us for our next episode of Case In Point. 
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